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Introduction 
Gramsci’s writings have rarely been discussed and used systematically by scholars in 
cultural policy studies, despite the fact that in cultural studies, from which the field 
emerged, Gramsci has been a major source of theoretical concepts.  Cultural policy 1
studies were in fact theorised as an anti-Gramscian project between the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s, when a group of cultural-studies scholars based in Australia  advocated 2
a major political and theoretical reorientation of the discipline away from hegemony 
theory and radical politicisation, and towards reformist-technocratic engagement with 
the policy concerns of contemporary government and business.  Their criticism of the 3
‘Gramscian tradition’ as inadequate for the study of cultural policy and institutions has 
remained largely unexamined in any detail for almost twenty years and seems to have 
had a significant role in the subsequent neglect of Gramsci’s key concepts in this area of 
study.  4
This essay is an attempt to challenge such criticism and provide an analysis of 
Gramsci’s writings with the aim of proposing a more systematic contribution of his 
work to the theoretical development of cultural policy studies. The reason for doing so 
is that Gramsci’s writings undermine the very concept of cultural policy as commonly 
understood, thus providing us with a working model for subjecting it to a fundamental 
critical rethinking. They are resistant to commonly held ways of thinking about 
questions of cultural policy, and through this resistance they force us to think deeply and 
outside the boundaries of our normally accepted ideas and assumptions. Gramsci’s 
prison writings, in particular, are extremely radical, original and even unpredictable. If 
we are to benefit from Gramsci’s ideas, then we have to open up as much as possible to 
Gramsci’s challenging inventiveness, his creative use of language and concepts,  his 5
peculiar methods,  his pushing of the reasoning to the extreme of paradox,  and his 6 7
constant opening up of difficult questions. I therefore analyse some of the 
interpretations of his thought that have already circulated within cultural policy studies 
before moving on to interrogating the more unsettling, less familiar territories that are 
directly relevant to cultural policy questions.  
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At a time in which cultural policy studies are running the risk of developing in 
an ever more inert, passive, and pragmatic direction, it is vital to shake the virtual 
monopoly of the reformist-technocratic paradigm by injecting radical interventions into 
the debate. In the climate of cynical relativism and reduced horizons that has been 
brought about by by the neoliberal context for intellectual work, it is essential to 
reintroduce questions of human emancipation into the debate. Clearly, Gramsci is only 
one of the many potential radical voices that can contribute to challenging the current 
reformist-technocratic agenda in this area of study,  but perhaps it is precisely because 8
of Gramsci’s particular destabilising potential that his contribution has been strenuously 
fought, in this way perhaps unwittingly reconnecting to Cold War intellectual hostility 
towards Gramsci’s positive conception of the relationship between culture and politics.  9
Given the misrepresentations of Gramsci and his intellectual legacy on questions of 
cultural policy, their reintroduction into the debate is a complex and vast task, and its 
different aspects need to be dealt with separately. This essay therefore consists of three 
parts.In Part One, I question the use of the notion of ‘Gramscian tradition’ made by its 
critics and challenge the claim that it was inadequate for the study of cultural policy and 
institutions. In parts Two and Three, I consider Gramsci’s specific writings on questions 
of cultural strategy, policy and institutions, which have so far been overlooked by 
scholars, arguing that they provide further analytical insights to those offered by his 
more general concepts. More specifically, in Part Two, I consider Gramsci’s pre-prison 
writings and political practice in relation to questions of cultural strategy and 
institutions. I argue that the analysis of these early texts, which were written in the years 
in which Gramsci was active in party organisation and leadership, is fundamental not 
only for understanding the nature of Gramsci’s early and continued involvement with 
questions of cultural strategy and institutions, but also as a key for deciphering and 
interpreting cultural policy themes that he later developed in the prison notebooks, and 
which originated in earlier debates. Finally, in Part Three, I carry out a detailed analysis 
of Gramsci’s prison notes on questions of cultural strategy, policy and institutions, 
which enrich the theoretical underpinnings for critical frameworks of analysis as well as 
for radical practices of cultural strategy, cultural policy-making and cultural 
organisation. I then answer the question of whether these insights amount to a theory of 
cultural policy. 
My discussion here is not meant to offer an alternative to other existing or 
potential contributions of Gramsci’s writings to the broader analysis of the links of 
cultural and economic policy, or to other potential extensions of Gramsci’s analyses. On 
the contrary, it is meant to be in addition to them. Given the specific focus of my essay, 
although I will provide brief explanations of Gramsci’s concepts in footnotes or, where 
necessary, by incorporating them in my discussion, it is beyond the scope of this essay 
to offer a preliminary introduction to his thought,  or to the many controversies that 10
have surrounded the interpretation of his writings.  Finally, I do not aim to provide 11
examples of applications of my conclusions. These can however offer the basis for 
further specific empirical work. 
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1. The criticism of the ‘Gramscian tradition’ 
Tony Bennett, perhaps the leading figure of the Australian school of cultural policy 
studies,  and the most vocal of the critics of the ‘Gramscian tradition’, argued that the 12
reasons why this intellectual tradition was theoretically inadequate for the study of 
cultural policy and institutions were:  13
1) its definition of culture as ‘whole ways of life’ (from Raymond Williams’s 
keywords), which for Bennett served to legitimise the study of popular culture ‘as the 
forcing ground for forms of symbolic opposition to culture in its more restricted 
dominant and aesthetic form’,  a definition that for Bennett missed the key 14
transformation of culture, from the late eighteenth century, into ‘a historically specific 
set of institutionally embedded relations of government’,  and generated ‘forms of class 15
essentialism’;  16
2) its commitment to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony,  because of the central 17
role given to ‘class as the coordinating centre of social and political life’, which ‘can 
neither be sustained theoretically nor, anymore, be of much service politically’;  18
3) its theory of agency for being based on such categories as class, race and 
gender (which for Bennett appeared to exist only as ‘targets’ but not as ‘social agents’ of 
political programmes),  and on the model role of the ‘organic intellectual’,  adopted 19 20
by Stuart Hall,  for being a role ultimately unable to connect with policy-makers and 21
moved instead by the objective of producing oppositional subjects organised as a 
collective force through cultural means, rather than by engaging with institutional 
contexts.   22
To sum up, the key issues were: the definition of culture as ‘whole ways of life’; 
the concept of ‘hegemony’; and the concept of the ‘organic intellectual’. The joint 
adoption of such concepts apparently determined for Bennett whether individual 
scholars belonged to the ‘Gramscian tradition’ and thus whether their work should be 
considered incompatible with the study of cultural policy. Nonetheless, out of these 
three concepts, only two were associated with Gramsci (‘hegemony’ and ‘organic 
intellectual’) and only one was unique to Gramsci (‘organic intellectual’).  23
Bennett also articulated specific criticism of Gramsci’s thought by setting up an 
unfavourable comparison with Foucault.  He represented Gramsci’s conception of 24
power ‘as arising from a highly unified and centralised origin’ in ‘the ruling class’,  25
and criticised the concept of hegemony because of its being exclusively concerned with 
culture and ideology and because its objectives were ‘to be accomplished by exposing 
(...) [the popular] classes, regularly and routinely, to bourgeois ideologies and values’.  26
Bennett capitalised on one of Foucault’s maxims to caricature the holders of such a 
concept of hegemony: ‘“The problem”, as Foucault put it, “is not changing people’s 
consciousness – or what’s in their heads – but the political, economic, institutional 
régimes of the production of truth”’.  By this he possibly meant that the point was to 27
speak not to the people, but to the government – which, for Bennett, was apparently 
sufficient to explain why Foucault could be reconciled with cultural policy studies 
understood as reformist-technocratic engagement with government and business, while 
Gramsci could not. Elsewhere, in a more general critique of cultural studies, Bennett 
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also criticised the historical-materialist orientation, arguing that it should be scaled 
down to a Foucauldian form of materialism, in which history was seen not as the 
expression of ‘a more fundamental cause’ such as the mode of production, but as the 
generator of ‘forms of social life and conduct’.   28
 However, it is possible to argue that Bennett’s criticism of Gramsci and the 
‘Gramscian tradition’ was based on a series of conceptual and logical problems: 
1) an inadequate understanding of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as limited to 
culture and ideology and ultimately consisting of ideological indoctrination.  
2) an unexamined and unexplained assumption that Gramsci was not interested 
in changing ‘the political, economic, institutional regimes of the production of truth’;  
3) a critique of the historical-materialist orientation that was in strange conflict 
with the idealist understanding of the concept of hegemony (see point 1). 
4) an unexamined and unexplained assumption that symbolic opposition to 
dominant or aesthetic cultural forms was inherently incompatible with an interest in 
governmental questions;  
5) a conflation of the unwillingness of the ‘Gramscian tradition’ to engage with 
the ‘institutional conditions’ of culture with a theoretical inability to do so; 
6) an arbitrary reduction of the categories of class, gender and race to the 
passivity of targets of governmental programmes – a revisionist position that seemed to 
deny the historical existence of class conflict, feminism, and anti-racist movements as 
actual powerful social agents of historical change. 
The conceptual and logical problems in Bennett’s criticism do not seem to 
require further discussion in the limited scope of this article, but I will return to them at 
the end of Part Three, in the light of my detailed analysis of Gramsci’s specific writings 
on cultural policy and institutions. In the rest of this article, instead, I only wish 
preliminarily and critically to analyse Bennett’s notion of ‘Gramscian tradition’ by 
focusing particularly on the two main concepts involved in such notion: culture and 
hegemony, which arguably are the most variable ones within the ‘Gramscian tradition’ 
because they are not unique to Gramsci. My argument is that there are fundamental 
differences, even between Gramsci and Williams, in the understanding of the two 
concepts. This discrepancy between two such key figures in the ‘Gramscian tradition’ 
throws a problematic light on the assumption that it is possible to criticise such tradition 
as a single, coherent phenomenon. 
Gramsci’s concept of culture 
David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith have argued that Gramsci, in his prison 
notebooks, never defined the concept of culture theoretically and always relied 
implicitly on the definition ‘derived from the traditional socialist thinking which 
provided his early cultural-political formation’.  It could be counter-argued, however, 29
that Gramsci constantly worked on the theoretical elaboration of the concept. On the 
one hand, the concept was central to his political thinking from his early days as a 
socialist activist to his last writings in prison, and therefore it underwent constant 
elaboration and development through critical engagement with different schools of 
thought and, especially, as part of the development of his political thought.  On the 30
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other hand, as Anne Showstack Sassoon has demonstrated, Gramsci tended to rely on 
existing accepted concepts to give them new meanings, through a complex process of 
elaboration, to offer new understandings of phenomena or to explain new developments 
that were taking place in the real world.   31
Moreover, Gramsci did not seem to consider the culture of different social strata 
as necessarily part of a single general phenomenon that could be preliminarily defined. 
For example, by reading his notes on folklore, it is possible to infer that the ‘conception 
of the world’ of the hegemonic groups and that of the subaltern groups were, for him, 
two discrete, separate and distinct entities, which worked according to a morality that 
was ‘in contradiction’ or ‘simply different’.  In order to account for the way in which 32
culture worked in such different realms of social life, Gramsci needed to refer to 
different intellectual traditions and methods. All this shows that his concept of 
hegemony was not necessarily associated to any particular notion of culture. 
It is significant that none of the existing glossaries of Gramsci’s concepts has 
ventured a definition of ‘culture’.  Kate Crehan has argued that Gramsci’s concept of 33
culture cannot in fact be defined; to explain it, it is necessary to ‘map out’ the full 
terrain that it occupied in Gramsci’s writings,  a task that has taken as many as three 34
chapters of her book. Birgit Wagner has tried to categorise the content of Gramsci’s 
prison notebooks 16 and 26, which are titled ‘Argomenti di cultura’ (‘Cultural themes’). 
The list of themes that Wagner has identified includes what today would come under the 
following intellectual categories: the history of mentalities, epistemological issues, 
philosophy and history of philosophy, economics and history of economics, theory of 
the state, questions of nomenclature, and a literary project.  A list of the sub-topics of 35
these broad categories occupies three pages of her essay. 
It is also possible to argue that different definitions of culture as starting points 
to Gramsci’s elaborations were often implied in the diverse methods and traditions of 
analysis that he adopted for the discussion of aspects of culture in a range of different 
social realms. For example, in his preparatory notes for a history of intellectuals he 
indicated in ‘cultural history’ (storia della cultura according to the German tradition of 
Kulturgeschichte and as developed by German scholars in the last two decades of the 
19th century) and in the ‘history of political science’ (storia della scienza politica, or 
‘intellectual history’), the two methods that he would utilise.  In the tradition of 36
Kulturgeschichte, ‘culture’ meant the bringing together of the histories of philosophy, 
literature, language, science, the arts, to discuss them in relation to the Zeitgeist.  37
However, because at the time in which Gramsci was writing, cultural history did not 
include popular culture,  when he moved on to incorporating popular culture into the 38
discussion, he adopted, as a starting point, a specific understanding of culture that was 
commonly accepted by the ‘science of folklore’ of his time, and which he immediately 
challenged.  In his writings on ‘Science and scientific ideologies’, instead, Gramsci 39
noted that science was ‘una categoria storica’ whose object was culture understood as a 
‘conception of the world’ in the sense of ‘the relationship between humanity and reality 
as mediated by technology’,  a concept with a similar meaning to that of ‘civilisation’. 40
But when he discussed Dante, Ibsen, or Pirandello Gramsci referred to a literary notion 
of culture.   41
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Arguably, the use of such different traditions, methods, and sources of 
understandings of the notion of culture was necessary to arrive at a theorisation of the 
complex relationships between the cultural, the political and the economic in different 
social realms. It was while commenting on De Sanctis’s essay ‘La cultura politica’,  42
that Gramsci eventually defined culture as ‘a coherent, integral and nationwide 
“conception of life and man”, a “lay religion”, a philosophy that has become “culture”, 
that is, one that has generated an ethic, a life-style and an individual and civil pattern of 
behaviour’.  But as I emphasise in Part Three, this happened in 1934, i.e. quite towards 43
the end of his productive life, as a summary of his development of the concept, not as an 
introductory definition. As Peter Ives has perceptively noted more generally in relation 
to Gramsci’s eschewal of preliminary definitions, ‘it is almost as if he is practising 
Wittgenstein’s dictum, “the meaning of a word is its use in the language”, rather than 
some stated definition prior to its use’.   44
From this discussion it is possible to conclude that the concept of culture in 
Gramsci is far more complex than can be captured by its definition as ‘whole ways of 
life’. 
Williams’s concept of hegemony 
Gramsci entered cultural studies not only directly, through his own writings, but also 
mainly through Williams’s elucidation of the concept of hegemony in his article ‘Base 
and superstructure in Marxist theory’ (1973) and in his book Marxism and Literature 
(1977),  and by the influence of Williams as one of the founding fathers of cultural 45
studies. Williams was in fact particularly interested in the concept of hegemony because 
it provided an account of the relationship between the economic base and the 
superstructures that avoided economic determinism (or the tendency to see culture as an 
epiphenomenon of the economic),  it retained a strong sense of human agency and of 46
the role of culture in history, and did not reduce consciousness to the ideology 
propagated by the dominant class.  Yet, it is possible to argue that Williams went 47
beyond Gramsci in his understanding of the concept, arriving at an original 
interpretation. This had important consequences for the emergence of a ‘Gramscian 
tradition’ because Williams’s original interpretation of hegemony, which was often 
taken to be a mere elucidation of Gramsci’s, was very influential within cultural studies.  
Williams had already argued, in his 1973 article ‘Base and superstructure in 
Marxist cultural theory’, that Gramsci’s principle of hegemony opened up the 
possibility of introducing the ideas of ‘alternative’ and ‘opposition’ to the ‘dominant 
culture’ – a possibility that, in his view, was not available in other more deterministic 
versions of Marxism.  Williams thus established a distinction between ‘residual’ and 48
‘emergent’ forms of ‘alternative’ and ‘oppositional’ culture in relation to the ‘dominant’ 
culture.  Nonetheless, because of his syncretism,  a final attribution of these categories 49 50
to him, rather than to Gramsci, for readers who were not already familiar with 
Gramsci’s writings was probably not straightforward. These categories appeared again 
in the chapter on hegemony in Williams’s Marxism and Literature,  where hegemony 51
was related to the category of ‘the dominant’, while the concepts of ‘counter-hegemony’ 
and ‘alternative hegemony’ were introduced as ‘real and persistent elements of practice’ 
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to account for ‘resistance or opposition’ and the category of ‘the alternative’.  Through 52
this, Williams was revising the notion of hegemony. A whole chapter of Marxism and 
Literature was in fact devoted to the full development of the categories of ‘the 
dominant’, ‘the residual’ and ‘the emergent’.  The residual, explained Williams, ‘may 53
have an alternative or even oppositional relation to the dominant culture’ but at the same 
time the dominant culture incorporated some of the residual through the work of a 
‘selective tradition’.  ‘The emergent’, instead, was a kind of ‘new’ that consisted of 54
new values, meanings and practices brought about by the emergence of a new class and 
which was not incorporated in the dominant culture but, on the contrary, remained 
alterative and oppositional to it.  Although these categories could be seen as 55
developments or extrapolations of Gramsci’s ideas of the traditional intellectual as 
residual from an earlier hegemony and of the organic intellectuals as emerging out of 
the subordinate classes, in Gramsci these concepts were not generalised and 
schematised. 
Most importantly, by introducing the concept of counter-hegemony Williams 
arguably returned to the traditional meaning of hegemony as ‘domination’, which 
Gramsci had transcended. In Gramsci, hegemony referred precisely to the opposite of 
domination.  This clearly amounted to a fundamental difference between Williams’s 56
and Gramsci’s understanding of the concept. Nonetheless, Williams’s concept of 
hegemony, with an associated emphasis on the antonymic couples ‘dominant’ vs. 
‘oppositional’ and ‘hegemonic’ vs. ‘counter-hegemonic’, is the way in which the 
concept of hegemony has often tended to be understood and utilised within cultural 
studies. The explanation of the concept that can be found in cultural studies books 
seems to indicate this understanding: 
The theory of hegemony was of central importance to the development of British cultural 
studies (not least in the work of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies). It facilitated analysis of the ways in which subordinate groups actively respond to 
and resist political and economic domination.  57
Gramsci sees ideology as a site of particularly vigorous contestation, and the popular 
culture as a source of considerable resistance to hegemonic formation.  58
However, (...) hegemony can never be total. There are always emergent forms of 
consciousness and representation which may be mobilized in opposition to the hegemonic 
order. This means that a lot of work, called ideological labour, goes into the struggle 
between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forms. And what’s at stake in the long term in 
this struggle can be political and economic power itself.  59
  
In the last example, the idealist separation of culture from the social is significant: 
cultural struggle seems to be considered sufficient to counter domination. This problem 
of interpretation of the concept of hegemony, which introduces yet another 
understanding of the concept within what Bennett has called the ‘Gramscian tradition’, 
was identified by Hall as a more general problem of the assimilation of Marxist 
theorists cleansed of their Marxist meaning and implications. 
I notice there is now a very rapid assimilation of the Althusserian moment into 
literary studies but without its Marxist connotations. And I notice the same 
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thing about Gramsci’s work. Suddenly, I see Gramsci quoted everywhere. 
Even more troubling, I see Gramscian concepts directly substituted for 
some of the very things we went to Gramsci to avoid. People talk about 
‘hegemony’ for instance as the equivalent of ideological domination. I have 
tried to fight against that interpretation of ‘hegemony’ for twenty years.  60
In Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, there was no emphasis on cultural struggle, in 
isolation from economic and political aspects, as sufficient for social change. Gramsci 
seemed to think that the subordinate classes did not have the possibility of actively 
engaging ‘modern culture’, the official culture of the hegemonic groups, on its terrain 
through effectively oppositional cultural forms. The subaltern groups ‘cannot possess 
conceptions which are elaborated, systematic and politically organized and centralized 
in their albeit contradictory development (...) if indeed one should not speak of a 
confused agglomerate of fragments of all the conceptions of the world and of life that 
have succeeded one another in history’.  Therefore, the subaltern social groups needed 61
to leave behind their subaltern conception of the world and ‘bring about the birth of a 
new culture among the broad popular masses, so that this separation between modern 
culture and popular culture (...) [or] folklore will disappear’.  This possibly means that 62
in Gramsci, without such deep transformation, alternative or oppositional cultural 
meanings and practices occurring on the cultural plane, even if realistic, would be of 
little consequence. Arguably, for him the existing hegemony could not be replaced 
through cultural struggle alone. 
It is therefore clear that Williams’s concept of hegemony is significantly 
different from Gramsci’s, and that the concept of hegemony often adopted in what has 
been referred to as the ‘Gramscian tradition’ can have little in common with both 
Gramsci’s and Williams’s. 
2. ‘The turn to Gramsci’ and the Gramscian study of cultural policy 
The confusion over Bennett’s notion of a ‘Gramscian tradition’ within cultural studies 
becomes even greater if we consider the fact that a number of its critics had once been 
amongst the most committed proponents of a ‘turn to Gramsci’ in the study of popular 
culture. This introduces yet another strand of ‘Gramscian tradition’ that overlaps with 
the idealist understanding of the concept of hegemony that we have already 
encountered. In 1986, Bennett himself was the main advocate of such turn to Gramsci. 
He proposed it in the introduction to an anthology of essays that he edited and wrote 
with a group of scholars who, from 1982 to 1987, ran an influential distance-learning 
course titled Popular Culture at the Open University.  To be able to understand 63
Bennett’s later criticism of the Gramscian tradition and of Gramsci, it is therefore 
necessary to examine his use of Gramsci’s concepts. 
Apparently it was not directly Gramsci’s writings that informed Bennett’s ‘turn’, 
but a version of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony ‘theoretically enriched’ (to borrow 
David Forgacs’s expression) with Laclau’s and Mouffe’s assimilation of Althusser’s 
concept of interpellation and with Laclau’s concept of articulation.  Bennett’s adoption 64
of a Gramscian framework was an attempt at using Gramsci for addressing the 
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divergence, within cultural studies, between what Stuart Hall had defined as its ‘two 
paradigms’: culturalism and structuralism.  Bennett explained that both positions were 65
problematic in themselves. While structuralism considered popular culture ‘as an 
“ideological machine” which dictated the thoughts of the people’, culturalism ‘was 
often uncritically romantic in its celebration of popular culture as expressing the 
authentic interests and values of subordinate social groups and classes’, which ‘resulted 
in an essentialist view of culture (...) as the embodiment of specific class or gender 
essences’.  For Bennett, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, ‘especially when viewed in 66
the light of recent developments in discourse theory’,  had the power of undermining 67
the two equally problematic sides of the opposition.  The reason for this, Bennett 68
argued, was that in Gramsci ‘popular culture is viewed neither as the site of the people’s 
cultural deformation nor as that of their cultural self-affirmation (...); rather, it is viewed 
as a force-field of relations shaped, precisely, by these contradictory pressures and 
tendencies’.  Hegemony was thus explained as a struggle ‘for moral, cultural, 69
intellectual and, thereby, political leadership over the whole of society’,  where the 70
political seemed a mechanical implication of the cultural, while the structural dimension 
was not even contemplated. Through this interpretation, hegemony tended to become a 
struggle exclusively on the cultural terrain and for culture’s sake. 
A bourgeois hegemony is secured not via the obliteration of working class culture, but via 
its articulation to bourgeois culture and ideology so that, in being associated with and 
expressed in the forms of the latter, its political affiliations are altered in the process.   71
This clearly amounted to an idealist notion of hegemony as limited to the cultural 
terrain, and implied an essentialist conception of culture as automatically determining 
political affiliation. Added to this, the concept of articulation derived from discourse 
theory further neutralised any historical-materialist context of social stratification for 
such cultural struggle. For Bennett, the concept of articulation enabled a more 
satisfactory understanding of bourgeois culture as ‘a mobile combination of cultural and 
ideological elements derived from different class locations which are, but only 
provisionally and for the duration of a specific historical conjuncture, affiliated to 
bourgeois values, interests and objectives’.  Thus, after all, class affiliation appeared as 72
a minor detail. Perhaps instead of an ‘enrichment’ of the concept of hegemony, we 
should more correctly speak of its emptying, or spoiling – arguably, to make it 
compatible with a non-Marxist view of society. 
In the collection of essays on the ‘turn to Gramsci’ edited by Bennett in 1996, 
which was supposed to illustrate the turn to such emptied concept of hegemony, Stuart 
Hall’s essay ‘Popular culture and the State’ made only partial use of Laclau’s 
articulation theory as an adjunct to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, retaining a strong 
rooting in questions of class, and a critical approach. With this piece, Hall moved 
towards the study of the ways in which the institutions of the state contributed to the 
hegemonic process. Through this interest, cultural studies reconnected with Richard 
Hoggart’s and Raymond Williams’s earlier interests in questions of cultural policy and 
institutions.  Yet the significance of Hall’s piece of work, which should perhaps be 73
considered the foundational act of a Gramscian theoretical interest in cultural policy 
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within cultural studies, has been indirectly obscured by the Australian school’s censure 
of the ‘Gramscian tradition’ as unsuitable for the study of cultural policy and 
institutions. It is therefore useful to outline Hall’s essay briefly. 
Hall attempted a history of cultural policy in Britain since the seventeenth 
century, analysing the law, the press, and broadcasting, ‘to show how cultural 
institutions and practices institutionalise (settle, fix, secure, stabilise) a particular pattern 
of relations between cultures and classes in society’.  By applying Gramsci’s notion of 74
the educational role of the state, and probably also through inspiration from E. P. 
Thompson’s work, Hall examined the ways in which the relations between popular 
culture and the state in the context of ‘the shifting boundary line between state and civil 
society’ reflected both the changing character of the state and of class relations. 
Gramsci’s notion of the educational state had already been used in Nicholas Pearson’s 
study The State and the Visual Arts (1982), for a political understanding of the 
relationship between the state and the institutions of the visual arts in Britain over two 
centuries, particularly concentrating on the role of museums and exhibitions. While in 
Pearson, however, Gramsci’s passages were just mentioned as a source of inspiration, 
Hall developed, together with the empirical analysis, a theoretical discussion. The 
notion of a permeability between the political society (i.e. the state traditionally 
understood as government) and civil society was a clear indication that his frame of 
reference was Gramsci’s concept of integral state.  75
Two years later, Bennett followed Hall’s path in viewing cultural institutions as 
an area of interest for cultural studies and in using Gramsci’s notion of the educational 
role of the state for their empirical study. The focus of his analysis, however, as in 
Pearson, was the public museum. Moreover, unlike Hall, from the very beginning 
Bennett only used individual concepts from Gramsci’s thought, and these were not 
framed by the broader theory of the integral state. In fact, Bennett had to look elsewhere 
for a link between the state and cultural meanings in civil society. For example, in his 
article ‘The exhibitionary complex’ (1988), he analysed the relations of the universal 
exhibition to the development of the ‘bourgeois democratic polity’  by combining 76
Gramsci’s notion of the educational role of the state with a Foucauldian analysis of the 
meaning of the architecture of the museum as material and symbolic ‘embodiments’ of a 
‘power to tell’ comparable to the ‘power to punish’ of the prison.  In Bennett’s method 77
of utilisation of different theoretical sources, the individual concepts were juxtaposed as 
in a patchwork. Contrary to Hall’s eclecticism and Williams’s syncretism,  Bennett’s 78
coordination, or perhaps parataxis, did not integrate the different conceptual sources, but 
made each to work independently to explain a particular characteristic of the cultural 
institution. 
In his later article ‘The political rationality of the museum’ (1989), Bennett’s 
method of combining different theoretical sources moved from parataxis to what could 
be called a ‘layering’ method. He in fact layered the Gramscian perspective, as a less 
effective alternative, under a Foucauldian interpretation of the ‘political rationality’ 
embodied in the birth of the museum as a ‘technology’ comparable to the prison, the 
hospital and the asylum, and aimed at ‘regulating the conduct of individuals and 
populations’.  Here the limitations of Bennett’s conception of the state for a study of 79
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cultural policy are clearly evident, as the state seems to be conceptualised as an obscure 
but highly centralised entity with a clear political rationality (i.e., with objectives) but 
without any motivation outside such abstract rationality in and for itself. 
On Hall’s earlier example, Bennett also directed his attention to the institutions 
of popular culture. For this task, however, he did not use the notion of the educational 
role of the state, but Gramsci’s insights on folklore, which he applied to a study of the 
British post-war ‘flurry of new museum initiatives – folk museums, open-air museums, 
living history farms – orientated towards the collection, preservation and display of 
artefacts relating to the daily lives, customs, rituals, and traditions of non-élite social 
strata’.  In his study, by taking Gramsci’s criticism of the science of folklore of his time 80
as inspiration, Bennett complained that the spread of the museums of popular culture 
had ‘resulted in a “peopling of the past” in which the cultures and values of non-élite 
strata are subordinated to bourgeois culture and values’.  The solution that he proposed 81
for this problem consisted in devising different ‘structures of control over museums and 
a radical reorganization of their relations to different groups in the community’.  For 82
Bennett, it was in fact possible, through a kind of curatorship receptive of new scientific 
work, to generate better curatorial practices and therefore more complex representations 
of the ‘everyday lives of ordinary people’.  In Bennett’s focus on a correct 83
representation of people, we can see a reformist-technocratic approach to cultural 
policy, perhaps in its developing stage. But how did such an approach relate to a 
‘Gramscian’ concept of folklore? The question I want to ask here is not about Gramci’s 
views of reformist politics, but about the kind of normative understanding of cultural 
policy that Bennett looked for in Gramsci. Nonetheless, in order to evaluate this, we 
need briefly to return to Gramsci’s notes on folklore. 
In Gramsci, folklore was ‘a conception of the world and life implicit to a large 
extent in determinate (in time and space) strata of society’.  It was ‘a reflection of the 84
conditions of cultural life’ of such strata,  and consisted of ‘a confused agglomerate of 85
all the conceptions of the world and of life that have succeeded one another in 
history’.  Folklore was, however, not an archaic cultural form isolated from the modern 86
world. On the contrary, it was subject to historical development and to the constant 
contribution of philosophy and modern science, to the point that it was possible to speak 
of ‘modern folklore’, in which ‘certain opinions and scientific notions, removed from 
their context and more or less distorted, constantly fall within the popular domain and 
are “inserted” into the mosaic of tradition’.  It was therefore in constant development, 87
and included some interesting elements that could be seriously studied as starting points 
for developing a political strategy, but for the most part the elements of popular culture 
were a powerful force that reproduced the condition of subordination.  For Gramsci, 88
therefore, a ‘science of folklore’ should produce seriously critical knowledge that should 
feed into the practice of teachers, who should use it to overcome folklore and uproot it 
from the mind of the youth of the subordinate social groups.  In these notes, which he 89
wrote in 1935, Gramsci was indicating a cultural strategy through which the peasants, as 
a subordinate but not fundamental social group, could be freed from folklore understood 
as a conception of the world that locked them to their own subordination and made them 
unable to connect with the developing hegemony of the urban working masses.  90
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Therefore, arguably, for Gramsci it was especially folklore itself that needed to be 
combated, whereas in Bennett it was only its study as a picturesque element: through 
better curatorship it would be possible to achieve a better representation of popular 
culture and offer it to the people as part of an educational programme. This was 
precisely the approach that Gramsci criticised in the scholars of folklore of his time: for 
them, folklore ‘is an end in itself or is only useful in offering to a people the elements 
for a deeper knowledge of itself’.  91
Indeed, Bennett may have been misled by a mistake in the English translation of 
Gramsci’s note. In fact, where Gramsci wrote: ‘Only in this way will teaching be more 
efficient and really bring about the birth of a new culture among the broad popular 
masses’,  the English translation says: ‘Only in this way will the teaching of folklore be 92
more efficient (...)’.  Yet it seems unlikely that for Gramsci a more efficient teaching of 93
folklore would be an objective. How could folklore be taught to the popular social strata 
if it had to be uprooted from the minds of their youth? And how could anybody teach 
the subordinate social groups something that was already their conception of the world? 
It is in fact possible to argue that in the logic of Gramsci’s notes on folklore, a museum 
of the culture of the subordinate classes would be seen as an institution established for 
the benefit of some other social strata – perhaps sectors of the middle classes who 
would in any case represent folklore according to their own conception of the world – 
no matter how good and ‘receptive of new scientific work’ the curatorial practices might 
be. The point I want to make here is that a discussion framed by Gramsci’s ideas on 
folklore should probably first of all raise the issue of whether a museum of folklore 
would make any politically progressive or emancipatory sense at all for the subordinate 
classes, before discussing which curatorial practices would be best suited to 
representing their culture. Thus whereas in Gramsci the centrality of culture derived 
from its ability to lock or unlock subordinate social groups to an existing social 
structure, in Bennett’s understanding it was just a terrain of cultural struggle for the sake 
of representation, i.e. of culture itself. 
It is perhaps significant that it has been in a wrongly translated note that Bennett 
found in Gramsci the inspiration for his policy recommendations in relation to the 
museums of popular culture. At some point, in fact, Bennett and other members of the 
Australian school who had initially thought that Gramsci would offer a supporting 
theory for their reformist-technocratic project were presumably disillusioned, and their 
earlier ‘turn to Gramsci’ became, in 1992, an invitation to the whole discipline of 
cultural studies to U-turn away from the ‘Gramscian tradition’. Bennett was to claim, at 
the time of this anti-Gramscian appeal, that the only kind of practical engagement 
enabled by Gramsci’s concept of hegemony consisted, for example, in ‘restructuring the 
representational practices of the museum to facilitate the emergence of the oppositional 
subject of a counter-hegemony’ –  an approach that he considered inadequate ‘to 94
engage practically and productively’ with museum policy-makers.  This can be seen to 95
amount to unconscious self-criticism, at least in the sense that it confirmed Bennett’s 
idealist misunderstanding of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. 
 Nonetheless, as we have seen, the ‘Gramscian tradition’ the Australian school 
moved away from was a very heterogeneous intellectual formation, which included both 
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much less and much more than Gramsci’s original ideas as well as, most importantly, 
the misinterpretation of some of his key concepts. This circumstance, together with the 
virtual obliteration of the actual pioneering role of Gramsci’s concepts and framework 
for the study of cultural policy and institutions, makes the Australian school’s 
assessment of the ‘Gramscian tradition’ problematic. It is therefore necessary to attempt 
a more adequate redefinition of the notion of the ‘Gramscian tradition’ within cultural 
studies, and then examine theoretically its ability to open the way to an understanding of 
cultural policy and institutions. 
3. Redefining the ‘Gramscian tradition’ 
Even in the light of the centrality of the concept of ‘hegemony’ within the ‘Gramscian 
tradition’, Bennett’s definition of the tradition as ultimately the adoption of the concept 
of ‘hegemony’ in conjunction a particular notion of culturedoes not seem an adequate 
strategy to identify a Gramscian tradition. As we have seen, there are different versions 
of the concept of hegemony, and these are not characterised by a specific associated 
concepts of culture, but by a specific theoretical model which works within certain 
theoretical boundaries. What characterised Gramsci’s concept of hegemony was that it 
was based on a unitary model (as opposed to what we could refer to as Williams’s 
‘double’ model and Laclau’s and Mouffe’s ‘articulation’ model),  which we could 96
tentatively define as working within the theoretical boundaries of: 
1) Gramsci’s concept of ‘philosophy of praxis’, or his particular reinterpretation 
of Marx’s historical materialism;  97
2) his concept of ‘historical bloc’, which conveyed the relationship of social 
groups with the unity of social-economic content and ethical-political form, of nature 
and spirit, of structure ad superstructure,  therefore replacing the traditional Marxist 98
notion of a ‘determination’ of the superstructures by the economic base; 
3) his political theory, in which hegemony was understood in the context of the 
theory of the ‘integral state’;  99
4) his commitment to the theory and practice of the revolutionary process of the  
socialist transformation of society.  100
These criteria should not be understood as defining elements of Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony. Nonetheless, if we need a method to be able to distinguish what 
can be considered part of a ‘Gramscian tradition’ in the use of the concept of hegemony 
within cultural studies, the boundaries set by this group of criteria, even if loosely 
understood, could help identify whether extrapolations, developments, enrichments and 
applications of the concept of hegemony could still be considered as based on Gramsci’s 
own conception of hegemony – thus as being part of a ‘Gramsci tradition’ proper within 
cultural studies. This is in fact a different process from establishing whether a piece of 
scholarly comment on Gramsci is accurate. While it is necessary for scholars to work 
scientifically on Gramsci’s texts, without creative applications such texts might remain 
useless to us. After all, Gramsci himself distinguished between these two aspects of a 
theoretical concept: one thing was the method of scholarly analysis,  quite another was 101
!13
the ‘fecundity’ of application.  An intellectual tradition of the use of the concept of 102
hegemony defined by the above boundaries, for example, could include Hall’s 
interpretation because, despite his eclectic method of incorporation of many other 
theoretical influences, he did not neglect the theoretical perimeters within which 
Gramsci understood the concept. Therefore, although Hall’s interpretation perhaps did 
not fully respond to ‘the need to consider Gramsci’s thought as an integral project’,  as 103
advocated by Peter Thomas for scholarship, it could be seen to be developed according 
to an attempt to be creative while trying to be faithful to the theoretical and practical 
commitments of Gramsci’s thought. 
Within the Marxist camp, we could also distinguish a ‘Williams tradition’ of 
interpretation of hegemony characterised by a different meaning of the word to 
Gramsci’s (i.e. as ‘domination’) and a theoretical development according to a ‘double’ 
rather than unitary model of the concept, with hegemony paired with ‘counter-
hegemony’ and related to the categories of the dominant, the residual, and the emergent. 
Williams’s remains a materialist concept but, as we have seen, developed within a 
cultural (rather than political) theory. 
We could also isolate a ‘non-Marxist tradition’ of interpretation of hegemony 
characterised by the replacement of the materialist element with a concentration on the 
cultural sphere only, in isolation from the economic and political elements of hegemony. 
This category would bring together all the non-materialist interpretations of the concept 
-- be they based on Gramsci’s unitary model, or on Williams’s ‘double’ model, or on 
Laclau’s and Mouffe’s post-Marxist ‘articulation’ model, for example. 
Within the latter category we could finally distinguish Bennett’s use of 
individual concepts from Gramsci’s writings in the context of an idealist understanding 
of the concept of hegemony. 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the analysis carried out, it is now possible to examine theoretically the 
potential for a redefined Gramscian tradition proper to open the way to an 
understanding of cultural policy and institutions. I will do this by comparing it with the 
idealist, non-Marxist tradition. 
An idealist versions of the concept of hegemony assumes that civil society is 
independent from the state traditionally understood as government, and therefore the 
concept of hegemony is understood in the context of cultural theory, and the analysis is 
limited to cultural politics. An idealist concept of hegemony thus favours a 
concentration of interest on the production and reception of cultural texts, which are 
ultimately external to the subjects (who may or may not produce or receive them or 
make them public), and their contexts, languages, readers, and effects.  Within this 104
concept, cultural politics taking place in the institutions of civil society has, as its 
central focus, the ideological work of private organisations – both ‘hegemonic’ 
organisations understood as ideologically dominant, like the press, the commercial 
media, advertising, religious organisations, and ‘oppositional’ organisations like social 
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movements.  Here, the interest is limited to the political dimension of culture, which is 105
captured by cultural theory.  
In an idealist understanding of hegemony, the study of cultural policy of 
governments (i.e. in political society) would need to be introduced in addition to the 
analysis of cultural politics in civil society. The two aspects of the analysis would 
therefore tend to be separated (one referring to civil society and the other to political 
society), and ways of connecting them would need to be devised.  106
In Gramsci, instead, civil society was not separated from the state, and the 
concept of hegemony was understood in the context of political (rather than cultural) 
theory, that is, in relation to Gramsci’s theory of the integral state. Whereas the idealist 
concept of hegemony refers only to the cultural aspects of hegemony, and therefore 
exhausts the hegemonic process within the mechanisms of ‘cultural politics’ in civil 
society, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony also referred to the complex interrelation of 
the political and the cultural, that is, cultural processes that should be seen as ‘political 
activities’.   107
Cultural processes related to political activities are internal to the subject – they 
constitute the human being politically, both individually and organised in social 
movements, and produce a political will;  and therefore cultural policy, through the 108
institutions of political society, focuses on the organisational work of public institutions 
like, for example, the public education system, government-funded cultural institutions, 
the juridical system, and official Churches recognised by the state. The interest is 
therefore not just in the political dimension of culture in civil society (culture as 
contributing to the moral and intellectual formation of individuals, who become aware 
of their role in society), but also and especially in the cultural dimensions of politics in 
political society, or, as Richard Johnson has argued, in ‘the cultural dimensions of 
struggles and strategies as a whole’.  The cultural dimension of politics is in fact 109
linked, in Gramsci, with the organisational dimension of modern capitalism and its main 
political consequence: the integral state. Therefore, within the framework of analysis of 
Gramsci’s principle of hegemony, the range of relevant organisations and institutions 
that need to be included in the study of cultural phenomena becomes very wide (as 
becomes very wide the category of the intellectual): public education system and private 
schools, public and commercial media, public and private arts and cultural 
organisations, state bureaucracies and capitalist management, the juridical system and 
political parties.  Moreover, as private and public organisations do not work as neatly 110
separated entities but are interlinked through the activities of the integral state, it is also 
in their reciprocal links that they need to be analysed.  
This significantly widens the study of cultural policy beyond its dimension as 
‘governmental’ activity. In Gramsci, culture is understood not as a separate element of 
social life which is produced as a resource by the organisations of civil society and 
which can become the object and instrument of government through the (ultimately 
coercive) deployment of legal, administrative and economic instruments.  The cultural 111
element is a constitutive part of the integral state. 
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